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 REWARD CROWDFUNDING CAMPAIGNS: TIME-TO-SUCCESS ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT  
The time-to-success of reward crowdfunding campaigns constitutes a relevant topic that has 
been neglected in business literature. In this study, we employ parametric and semi-parametric 
models of survival analysis to identify the determining factors of the duration of success of 
these campaigns. Based on more than 4,200 reward crowdfunding campaigns, our results are 
robust for controls and reveal that the campaigns that attain success most rapidly are located 
predominantly in cities with greater income inequality. These are cities that are characterized 
by lower fundraising targets and receive a larger number of pledges. In addition, our covariates 
indicate a non-constant influence on time-to-success during the fundraising period.  
Keywords: crowdfunding; entrepreneurial finance; fintech; survival analysis; financial 
innovation 
JEL: L26; G32; G41; O31; C41; I31 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most emblematic FinTech techniques is that of crowdfunding allowing 
entrepreneurs of new ventures to fund their efforts by drawing on relatively small contributions 
from a relatively large number of individuals (pledgers) through internet platforms without the 
use of standard financial intermediaries (Mollick, 2014, Landström et al., 2019). Crowdfunding 
financing has grown exponentially in recent years (Scott-Briggs, 2017), especially reward 
crowdfunding (Giudici et al., 2017, Chemla and Tinn, 2020). A large number of projects that 
find financing in this market would not have access to any traditional source of financing during 
the early stage (Hildebrand et al., 2017, Stanko and Henard, 2017).       
Understanding the determinants of crowdfunding campaign success over its duration is 
critical for entrepreneurs and campaign supporters. As campaigns are usually defined as all-or-




targeted amount is reached in a given limited duration of time), entrepreneurs are required to 
present campaigns in an attractive fashion as pledgers tend to contribute to campaigns that are 
perceived as worthy and are expected to succeed. Both entrepreneurs as well as pledgers are 
interested in a given campaign not only to achieve its target goal, but also to achieve it as 
quickly as possible (Crosetto and Regner, 2018). As fast as the target goal is reached, the 
project can start and the rewards can be received sooner. Notwithstanding this aspect, a number 
of campaigns have met with failure. It is the waste of time for the pledger and the waste of 
time, effort, and, eventually, money invested for campaign preparation for the entrepreneur, 
with there being no type of return, not even a non-financial return (Josefy et al., 2017).  
In this paper, we provide a replication and extension of previous studies focused on the 
role of success of crowdfunding campaign determinants by using survival analysis models. 
Specifically, we aim to identify the factors that impact the time-to-success of reward 
crowdfunding campaigns and introduce the new factor variables and new methods in the 
literature. In this sense, besides the factors already analyzed in the literature, we study the new 
drivers in the new institutional context and provide new results based on the statistical 
procedures not yet used in crowdfunding literature. 
We argue that the success of reward crowdfunding depends on its perceived viability, 
social merit, and impact. The pledgers may not only be motivated by self-benefit (the number 
of rewards received), but also the campaigns’ expected social benefits, that is, the types of 
projects and their ability to reduce inequality and promote social cohesion (Gerber and Hui, 
2013). We claim that, in cities with higher inequality, crowdfunding can connect the people in 
need of funding with the people attempting to contribute to inequality reduction through their 
pledges, and thus, can positively influence the time-to-success of crowdfunding campaigns. 




generate macro-economic implications in terms of income redistribution (Grüner and 
Siemroth, 2019). In this sense, we argue that the pledgers disregard self-benefit and prefer 
social benefits, contributing to higher rates for social projects, rather than other project types 
such as art, and they do so even more intensively in cities with higher income inequalities. We 
also address the unobserved heterogeneity of the campaigns’ quality to ensure the robustness 
of our results. 
From the point of view of entrepreneurs, this knowledge makes it possible to improve 
the delineation of the fundraising campaign profiles to increase the probability of success and 
accelerate the rhythm of fundraising. In terms of the current literature and the preeminence of 
the subject, we have noted that the research on the appropriate models to analyze the time-to-
success of crowdfunding campaigns is a subject of equal relevance and little investigation on 
it (Li et al., 2016), which put together, characterizes the present work as pioneering. In this 
article, we are particularly interested in gathering new empirical evidence regarding the success 
of campaigns by assuming an extended definition of success for reward crowdfunding 
campaigns. This is given that we contemplate not only the fact that the target amount has been 
achieved (Strausz, 2017), but more importantly, the aspect of time-to-success (Li et al., 2016, 
Crosetto and Regner, 2018).  
We use parametric and semi-parametric models of survival analysis (an umbrella term 
covering data analysis that describes the expected duration of time until a well-defined event 
occurs) to examine the determinants of the time-to-success of campaigns. The application of 
this technique is original in this field, and it generates a better estimation of the model 
parameters as the survival models incorporate information about the censored and uncensored 
observations (successful and unsuccessful campaigns) and the duration modeling in the 




between 2011 and 2016 on the largest crowdfunding platform in Brazil, one of the largest 
economies of the world (World Bank, 2019). Considering Brazil is a large country with 
significant socioeconomic asymmetries, reward crowdfunding could prove to be a relevant 
instrument for reducing inequality (Demir et al., 2016, Demir et al., 2020). The platform we 
studied raised more than R$ 38 million (1 USD ≈ 3.2 R$ in December 2016 and 5.50 R$ in 
September 2020) in the period of analysis in an all-or-nothing system, which highlights reward 
crowdfunding as a relevant form of funding for a variety of entrepreneurial projects.  
The dependent variable in the survival analysis consists of two parts: the moment of the 
event (the campaign’s time-to-success) and the status of the event (whether the campaign was 
a success or failure). The use of censoring in reward crowdfunding campaign survival analysis 
is a proper strategy to jointly investigate the success and the time-to-success of campaigns. We 
also carryout controls for the unobserved heterogeneity of the fundraising campaigns and 
censoring on the 59th and 60th day of the campaigns.  
Our results are equally new. They reveal and suggest that the specific attributes of 
campaigns, such as their location, can influence the time-to-success of reward crowdfunding 
campaigns. In general, the results show that the campaigns that achieve success more rapidly 
are characterized by a lower target amount, a larger number of pledges, a smaller number of 
rewards promised in exchange for pledges, and are predominantly non-art projects located in 
cities with greater income inequality. In addition, we found out that the covariates adopted in 
the empirical model influence time-to-success in a non-constant manner during the fundraising 
period. This has motivated the estimation of parametric models, which ratify the results 
obtained by the popular Cox proportional hazard (PH) models. Our results are robust to 
unobserved heterogeneity. This study contributes to crowdfunding literature in three ways. 




of campaign attributes on time-to-success. We assume the campaigns classified as failures 
could be successful if the active management of the fundraising process was viable during the 
fundraising period in such a way that it would increase the chances of attaining the target 
amount. Survival analysis models have advantages over the other binary response models, 
especially because they rarely allow the time variable to present missing values. In 
conventional binary analysis, unlike survival analysis, if some of the observations disappear 
before the end of the observation period, it implies the loss of relevant information about the 
analyzed event (Efron, 1988; Ohno-Machado, 2001; Liu, 2014). 
Second, we believe that the influence of campaign location characteristics is an open 
question that concerns the concentration of crowdfunding campaigns in certain cities with 
greater income inequality (Mollick, 2014). We also consider the geographic attributes of the 
location of reward crowdfunding campaigns. In this respect, we should point out that our results 
are supported by the data collected of an emerging economy in which social inequalities are 
explicit and the cost of capital is a limiting factor for the new ventures (Mendes-Da-Silva et al, 
2016). Very few research studies on reward crowdfunding have discussed the attributes of the 
locations in which the campaigns are centered, which may bring out the information regarding 
the social and economic development of the given region (Florida, 2014). An investigation of 
the local attributes regarding these campaigns can generate knowledge to promote the 
effectiveness of crowdfunding campaigns (Giudici et al., 2017). Third, while the literature is 
essentially characterized by OLS and logit models, we use survival analysis. Given that we 
also use robust models that violate the main assumption of the most disseminated model of 
survival analysis, we produce new evidence pertaining to the non-constant impact of the 
determining factors during the fundraising period. These results may be useful for 




If the crowdfunding literature has grown rapidly to the point where the success drivers 
of campaigns have been reasonably well documented, there is room to consider the possibility 
of new successful campaign drivers, in addition to the extensions and generalizations based on 
new evidences arising from new methods and new relevant institutional environments. Our 
study, even though it uses variables already documented in the crowdfunding literature, 
contributes to the theoretical and empirical development of this field, especially by promoting 
the generalization and extension of previous empirical findings. In alignment with Tsang and 
Kwan (1999, p. 766) and Ethiraj et al.’s (2016) findings and the principle that science is not 
built on novelty alone (Babin et al., 2021), we bring out new and revealing evidence that has 
not yet been explored from an institutional context and explore unique data, new variables, and 
statistical procedures that are not yet used in the crowdfunding literature. Therefore, we provide 
additional evidence to help build a cumulative body of knowledge in crowdfunding literature. 
This study is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the background and hypothesis of 
the reward crowdfunding campaign’s time-to-success that we tested. Section 3 then presents 
the methodology we used and the advantages of survival analysis for crowdfunding research. 
The results of the non-parametric, semi-parametric, and parametric analyses and robustness 
tests are discussed in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are presented in section 5.     
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Success of Reward Crowdfunding Campaigns 
In accordance with the theoretical fundamentals of crowdfunding (Strausz, 2017), the 
prediction pertaining to the success of reward crowdfunding campaigns is the key to the 
development of the crowdfunding industry, given that the prediction of success can assist 
individuals and organizations not only in their decision-making concerning the allocation of 




individual supporters. According to Strausz (2017), campaign success can be defined as 
follows: the entrepreneur is first asked to describe the following three elements of his/her 
campaign on the platform’s public webpage: i) a description of the consumer’s reward, which 
is typically the entrepreneur’s final product; ii) a pledge level 𝑝; and iii) a target amount 𝑇𝐴. 
After describing these elements, the crowdfunding campaign starts. For a fixed period of time, 
a consumer (backer or pledger) can pledge an amount 𝑝 to financially support the campaign. 
During the campaign, the platform provides accurate information about the aggregate level of 
the pledges so that a consumer can, in principle, condition his/her decision to pledge on the 
contributions of previous consumers. After the campaign ends, the platform compares the 
target amount 𝑇𝐴 to the sum of pledges 𝑃 ≡ 𝑛 · 𝑝, where 𝑛 is the number of pledging 
consumers (backers). If the aggregate pledges 𝑃 fall short of the target level 𝑇𝐴, the platform 
declares the crowdfunding campaign a failure.  
To the best of our knowledge, the literature (Table 1) has failed to take into 
consideration the determinants of the time that it takes for a campaign to attain value 𝑃, which 
is the main reason why this study is considered relevant, for it contributes to the development 
and consolidation of the reward crowdfunding theory. There are two particularly relevant 
aspects in estimating the success of campaigns: the classes of the explanatory variables adopted 
in the models and the classes of the models employed to estimate success. In terms of the 
variables, the literature points to various levels of analysis, ranging from the country level 
(Glazer and Konrad, 1996) to the individual level (Ordanini et al., 2011, Hu et al., 2015, 
Crosetto and Regner, 2018).  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We address the campaign characteristics and the cities in which they are located to test 
the survival analysis models. According to Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010), a 




Burtch et al. (2013) have found the duration of the fundraising period and the entrepreneur’s 
effort at the beginning of fundraising to have a positive relationship with the success of the 
campaign. Frydrych et al. (2014), in turn, has argued that the target and structure of rewards 
are elements that act with greater intensity to raise funds through campaigns. Material 
compensation (Vukovic et al., 2010) and social recognition (Eiteneyer et al., 2019) play a role 
in stimulating and increasing the participation of individuals in campaigns (Steinberg, 2012; 
Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015). The duration of campaigns and the income level of their cities 
were the predictors of success (Skirnevskiy et al., 2013; Giudici et al., 2017).  
As pointed out by Li et al. (2016), the identification of success via conventional binary 
models may be less robust, given that the models of this class do not distinguish the campaigns 
that obtained success more rapidly than others, and also treat all the campaigns that were not 
explicitly successful as failures, no matter how close the total attained was to the target value. 
In this sense, Lin et al. (2013) have argued that the success attained just on the last day of a 
campaign may be relevant due to the possibility of friction in this market, and above all due to 
the moral hazard and asymmetry of information between the agents (Strausz, 2017; Crosetto 
and Regner, 2018; Chemla and Tinn, 2020).  
2.2 Development of the Hypotheses  
Although the literature documents the relationship between the success of crowdfunding 
campaigns and a set of determinants, we have not yet found a peer-reviewed study that provides 
evidence about the impact of success determinants on the time-to-success of campaigns via 
survival models (Table 1). We provide replication and extensions in three main ways by 
studying the specific institutional context of Brazil. We use a unique data set and new variables. 
We use a statistical procedure not yet used in the crowdfunding literature, which allows us to 




proxies for the quality of the venture’s operational characteristics. In this respect, Cordova et 
al. (2015) have argued that the negative relationship between the fundraising target and the 
campaign’s time-to-success is due to the fact that part of the target amount desired by the 
entrepreneurs is arbitrary and may not demonstrate the business’ effective need for financing. 
Thus, it is understood that the campaigns that involve a smaller target have a greater probability 
of obtaining success faster. Basing on this, we formulate H1 as follows. 
H1: Higher fundraising targets negatively influence the time-to-success of reward 
crowdfunding campaigns.  
In addition to the fundraising target, the number of pledges that contribute to the 
campaign signal the quality of the project campaign and the credibility of the entrepreneur. 
Pledgers observe other pledgers’ behavior and use this information to generate a dynamic 
herding behavior (Bretschneider and Leimeister, 2017; Zaggl and Block, 2019). Early success 
in a campaign may generate positive feedback that reinforces contributions and determines the 
success of campaigns (Agrawal et al., 2015; Colombo et al., 2015; Josefy et al., 2017). This 
behavior is expected in the formation of communities as people tend to generate expectations 
through the participation of other people (Schelling, 1978, Rijt et al., 2014). In this manner, 
through the sense of community and herding behavior, it is expected that the campaigns that 
receive a greater number of pledges tend to have a greater probability of success. Therefore, 
we formulate H2 as follows. 
H2: The number of financial pledges received by a campaign positively influences its 
time-to-success.  
On the one hand, material rewards have been indicated as attractive elements for people 
to make contributions to crowdfunding campaigns (Steinberg, 2012, Hui, 2013). Participants 
in reward crowdfunding may wish to participate in financial campaigns to feel that they are 




Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) have argued that a symbolic reward or material reward may 
not be sufficiently significant to motivate people to enter campaigns, given that people may not 
trust these ventures and thus, opt not to get involved in any campaign. Rewards may symbolize 
reduced economic value, and in addition, there is a risk of not receiving them (Scholz, 2015). 
Thus, rewards alone may not be sufficient to attract contributions (Cholakova and Clarysse, 
2015). In any event, the rewards offered in exchange for participation in campaigns can 
increase a campaign’s chances of success, essentially by increasing the number of pledgers 
(Allison et al., 2014; Allison et al., 2015; Zvilichovsky et al., 2015). Colombo et al. (2015) 
share this train of thought and add that rewards may be considered as incentives to attract first-
time pledgers. Based on these arguments, we formulate H3 as follows.  
H3: The number of rewards promised by pledgers promote the time-to-success of 
campaigns.  
According to Mollick (2014), the geographic distribution of campaigns may not be 
uniform in a given region or country as the grouping of entrepreneurial activities may vary in 
accordance with local attributes such as the number of inhabitants and economic and social 
characteristics. This argument suggests that regions do not benefit equally from the financial 
advantages of crowdfunding (Kim and Hann, 2014). According to Agrawal et al. (2015), the 
location attributes that can help us understand the concentration pattern of crowdfunding 
projects are still not well understood, which indicates the need for carrying out research on this 
subject.  
Demir et al. (2020) claim that, although the theory suggests that financial market 
imperfections (mainly asymmetry of information, market segmentation, and transaction costs) 
prevent poor people from escaping poverty by limiting their access to formal financial services, 
FinTechs are seen as the key enablers of financial inclusion (Demir et al., 2020). They provide 




inequality. Grüner and Siemroth (2019) have shown that decentralized individual investments 
can efficiently allocate capital to innovating firms via crowdfunding. Furthermore, Kimura et 
al. (2018) have argued that a local disparity in income distribution can encourage pledgers to 
donate money. According to Zhang (2009), economic agglomeration and spatial concentration 
can influence a city’s level of competitiveness, which may be the result of the historic legacy 
of human capital and the quality of local governance, among other factors. Areas with less 
income distribution may thus, attract a greater number of crowdfunding ventures (Chen et al., 
2010). Furthermore, La Porta and Shleifer (2014) have found states with higher income 
inequality to be more likely to have higher levels of funding. According to Demir et al (2020), 
crowdfunding can induce a reduction in poverty and generate work opportunities. Based on 
this argument, we propose H4. 
H4: Campaigns located in cities with a greater concentration of income reach the target 
amount more quickly. 
 
Crowdfunding can be particularly important for developing countries. According to 
Stiglitz (2012), governments that seek to promote a more stable economy with a smaller 
likelihood of a downturn need to be attentive to inequality. Stiglitz (2012) argues that this is 
because developing countries are more vulnerable to shocks, and believes that efforts should 
be made to insulate them. Although inequality is relevant to industrialized countries as well 
(Hasanov and Izraeli, 2011, Chambers et al., 2019), the trade-offs that developing countries 
face are different. This suggests that particular caution is needed with respect to capital and 
financial market liberalization. The consideration of income inequality as a motivator for 
backers to engage in reward crowdfunding campaigns can highlight a research agenda, given 
the complexity of the background and consequences of income inequality in terms of 




and Izraeli, 2011, Vincens and Stafström, 2015, Beal and Astakhova, 2017, Chambers et al., 
2019). 
With regard to the relationship between inequality (or concentration of income) and the 
category of campaigns, the literature points out that a large portion of Brazil’s population is 
socially vulnerable (de Loyola Hummell et al., 2016, Costa et al., 2018). In alignment with this, 
there are arguments in the literature that suggest that individuals may be more sensitive to the 
crowdfunding campaigns of a social nature, for these can alleviate the problems that are not 
properly addressed by public officials (Defazio et al., 2021). Despite the fact that there is a 
willingness to finance projects of an artistic nature in Brazil (Mendes-Da-Silva et al., 2016), 
this funding does not necessarily come from wealthy individuals. Instead, there are reasons to 
assume that these individuals prefer to allocate resources to causes that are more oriented 
toward the solving of social problems, which may be due to altruism or the belief that potential 
gains can be shared by society (Mollick, 2014). 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data  
The data used in this study are unique and come from the largest reward crowdfunding platform 
operational in Brazil, one of the ten largest economies in the world. The Catarse platform has 
already raised more than R$ 72 million (1USD ~ 5.50R$ in September 2020) through 
contributions made by more than 450,000 pledgers in more than 6,200 campaigns initiated 
between 2011 and 2019. The platform adopts the all-or-nothing system (Hemer, 2011); 
therefore, if the target amount established by the entrepreneurs for a given campaign is not 
attained within the stipulated time frame, the campaign is canceled and the pledgers receive 




This study considered all the 4,262 campaigns distributed across Brazil’s 417 cities 
during the period 2011-2016, of which 2,223 (~52.15%) were successful campaigns and 2,039 
(~47.84%) were failures. We deal with a wide range of campaign types, ranging from 
architecture and urbanism (0.8% of the campaigns), science and technology (2%), education 
and sports (5%), journalism (2.4%), gastronomy (0.2%), environment (1.6%), and mobility and 
transport (0.6%) to campaigns dedicated toward the financing of art projects (78.5% of the 
campaigns).  
3.2 Variables and Models 
3.2.1 Variables of Interest 
Based on our review of the literature (Table 1), the variables we investigated as the 
determinants of time-to-success for reward crowdfunding campaigns are as follows:  
. 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 = a dummy that receives a value of 1 if campaign 𝑖 was successful in attaining the 
target amount 𝑇𝐴 (Strausz, 2017), and receives a null value if it was not.   
. ln 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 = the ln of the 𝑇𝐴 value (in R$) desired by campaign 𝑖. The variable was selected 
because the target amount can influence campaign success, and also serves as a proxy for the 
quality of ventures (Mollick, 2014, Giudici et al., 2013).  
. ln 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 = the ln of the number of pledgers that financially support a given campaign 𝑖, 
until its fundraising period ends. It was selected because this is considered to be an element 
that attracts other contributions and reduces uncertainty regarding the fundraising process via 
crowdfunding (Colombo et al., 2015; Josefy et al., 2017). 
. ln 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 = the ln of the number of rewards offered during the campaign, it is increased by 
one unit. According to Frydrych et al. (2014), material rewards can attract more participants to 




. 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = coefficient that measures the degree of concentration of income in a given group, i.e., 
for the city that is hosting campaign 𝑖. The Gini coefficient receives a value between 0 (an 
equality situation, i.e., everyone has the same income or there being a perfectly equal 
distribution of income; in this case, a given city would have 10% of the people with 10% of 
their income, 20% of the population with 20% of their income, and so on) and 1 (the opposite 
extreme, i.e., one person holds all of the local wealth or there is absolute inequality) (Krugman, 
1992). High inequality would be a level of extreme income inequality. In such a situation, there 
would be few rich individuals and many poor individuals, implying greater social inequality. 
However, cities with Gini coefficients closer to zero suggest a more balanced income 
distribution. Data related to this variable were collected from the most recent census available 
from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
(<http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/ibge/censo/cnv/ginibr.def>. According to Mollick (2014), 
the information related to income and spatial location can help us understand the 
disproportionate concentration of collective ventures and bring out important economic 
information about the dynamics of crowdfunding.  
. 𝐴𝑟𝑡 = the dummy variable that receives a value of 1 if campaign 𝑖 is dedicated to financing a 
project of an artistic nature and a null value if it is not. This variable has been adopted because 
rewards have been frequently used to finance projects of an artistic nature (Mendes-Da-Silva 
et al., 2016). The following types of projects are considered art projects: music, cinema and 
videos, theater, literature, comic books, support for projects in poor communities (folklore or 
martial arts), art, photography, games, dance, and circuses. The rest were classified as non-art 
projects (architecture and urbanism, carnivals, science and technology, design, education, 
sports, events, gastronomy, journalism, environment, mobility and transport, fashion, and 




adopted by the platform we studied, we used a dummy for the campaign categories. Following 
the recommendations of Carlson and Wu (2012), we adopted a group of control variables that 
are detailed below. 
. 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑑 = percentage of the elderly population in each city with which crowdfunding 
campaign 𝑖 was developed. This variable was selected because the success of reward 
crowdfunding may be influenced by demographic variables, especially age (Gamble et al., 
2017). In general, entrepreneurs are youth with a limited amount of capital (Gamble et al., 
2017). Probably, these entrepreneurs should count on the financial support of people with some 
financial independence in their financing campaigns. Thus, it seems reasonable to postulate 
that older people can contribute to projects, especially if they have some family ties with the 
entrepreneur (Agrawal et al., 2015).   
. 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 represents the percentage of illiteracy in the city hosting the crowdfunding 
campaign. According to Florida (2002) and Knudsen et al. (2007), human capital should meet 
the minimum levels of instruction to assure its role in society and in the economy of a given 
region, which may influence its participation in the crowdfunding campaigns.  
The occurrence of a well-defined event, such as a company’s bankruptcy, the firing of 
an executive, or the success of a fundraising campaign, is often a primary outcome in business 
research. This is essentially a binary outcome (the event has occurred versus it has not 
occurred). Binary outcome data were analyzed using logistic regressions. However, logistic 
regression analysis is not appropriate when the research question involves the length of time 
until the end point occurs (or time-to-event or failure time)—for example, estimating the 
median of survival times or plotting survival over time after a campaign begins.  
In the case of the current study, to develop a better understanding of the subject, instead 




interested in knowing if survival times are related to covariates and estimating the size of the 
effect of a specific covariate. Furthermore, it may initially appear that a research question about 
the length of a time interval, which is essentially a continuous outcome variable, can be 
addressed by linear regression or related techniques such as a t-test or variance analysis. 
However, a key distinction between survival times and other continuous data is that the event 
of interest would occur only in some, not in all the campaigns by the time the fundraising period 
ends. 
When using survival analysis, we provide new evidence by modeling multiple 
interdependent points in time, instead of modeling a single point. This is because there are a 
number of problems (which we address via survival analysis) in the latter procedure (Ohno-
Machado, 2001). In this regard, we can highlight the following: a single point estimate for a 
certain time limit may be misleading if its interpretation is extended for longer terms. While an 
isolated single-point estimate of survival may be useful for certain purposes, it provides no 
information on whether development seems to be fast or slow for a given campaign. In this 
sense, a single point estimate cannot illustrate the temporal patterns of crowdfunding campaign 
development.  
Aggregations of serial single-point estimates at pre-specified time intervals can be used 
to construct a time-oriented, prognostic “survival curve.” This estimation is difficult because it 
involves several time intervals, and data becomes scarcer in some of these intervals (e.g., some 
cases are lost to follow-up). Therefore, the confidence associated with each single-point 
estimate may vary significantly. Simple aggregation also does not consider the dependencies 
of the time-oriented data. Multiple point models are aimed to model survival for a prolonged 
period of time so that a meaningful survival curve can be generated. In multiple-point models, 




that non-monotonic survival curves are avoided as much as possible. These models generally 
produce better survival curves than those produced by the aggregation of single-point estimates 
as they often assume outcome dependency “built in.” In these methods, the estimates of 
survival and hazard functions are produced.  
For campaigns that survive (those that have not yet achieved success) until the end of 
the fundraising period, or which can no longer be followed before the end of the observation 
period, the entire survival times are unknown. Instead, it is known that the survival time is 
longer than the observation time. This unique feature of survival data is referred to as right 
censoring. Ignorance of censored campaigns in the analysis or simple equating of campaigns’ 
observed survival time (follow-up time) with the unobserved total survival time would 
contribute to the results being biased. Even if there was no censoring in the data set, survival 
times usually have a heavily skewed distribution, limiting the usefulness of statistical tests that 
assume a normal data distribution. An analysis of survival data is unique in that the research 
interest is typically a combination of whether the event has occurred (binary outcome) and 
when it occurred (continuous outcome). An appropriate analysis of survival data requires 
specific statistical methods that can deal with censored data.  
3.2.2 Survival Function and Hazard Function 
The survivor function is defined as the probability that an entity survives at least up to a certain 
time 𝑡, and that it is a non-increasing function. By definition, it has a value of one at time zero 
and a value of zero at infinity; it is defined as 𝑆(𝑡). The determinants of the time to the 
occurrence of a specific event of interest are common in various fields of research (Bai and 
Gillen, 2017). Survival analysis intends to obtain a time-dependent function whose value 
represents the probability of an event occurring after time 𝑡, or the probability that an event 




The time-to-success of a campaign is the duration of time between the start of the 
campaign and its success, i.e., the attainment of the target amount. This survival time is a 
random continuous variable 𝑇 with a cumulative distribution function 𝐹(𝑡) and probability 
density function 𝑓(𝑡). 𝐹(𝑡) is a failure function that provides the probability (𝑃𝑟) that an event 
will occur before a specific time 𝑡. Here, 𝐹(𝑡) is the probability that a campaign will succeed 
before 𝑡. The survival function 𝑆(𝑡) is the probability that the duration of a campaign will be 
greater than or equal to a given time 𝑡, as in (1).  
𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟 (𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) = 1 − 𝑃𝑟 (𝑇 > 𝑡) = 1 − 𝑆 (𝑡) 
 
(1) 
In other words, the entities where the event does not occur, such as crowdfunding 
campaigns that attain the target amount during the fundraising period established by the 
campaign hosting platform, are seen as valuable sources of information with respect to the 
determinants of the event. One of the most important properties of survival analysis is the 
capacity to censure observations that are commonly ignored by other methods, such as logit. 
An analysis of survival provides a group of relevant metrics, which we define below. The most 
important of these is the survival function denoted in (2) by 𝑆(𝑡|𝑥), which provides us with 
the survival probability at a given point of time, or the proportion of fundraising campaigns 
that are event-free at time 𝑡. Since our event of interest is the fact that a crowdfunding campaign 
has attained its target amount, time is measured by the number of campaign days.  
𝑆 (𝑡|𝑥) = 𝑆0 (𝑡) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑋} 
 
(2) 
Where 𝑋 is the vector of independent variables, 𝛽0 is the intercept, and 𝛽 is the vector of the 
coefficients of interest that are required to be estimated. The Kaplan-Meier estimator is a non-
parametric statistic for estimating 𝑆(𝑡|𝑥) using duration data. In the current study, this 
estimator measures the fraction of crowdfunding campaigns that have not achieved their target 




is the instantaneous rate of experiencing the event, given that the crowdfunding campaign is 
event-free at time 𝑡. This rate was measured using the hazard function denoted by ℎ(𝑡).  
The value of ℎ(𝑡) is not a probability. It is rather, a risk indicator of experiencing the 
event of a campaign attaining the target amount. The larger the values of ℎ(𝑡), the greater the 
risk that the event will occur later. In addition, ℎ(𝑡) is related to how quickly 𝑆(𝑡) diminishes 




. As a result, the hazard function increases over time. To state an example, suppose 
the two campaigns differ only in their relationship with the binary covariable 𝑥1, this would 
result in (3), which is as follows:  
𝑆(𝑡| 𝑥1 = 1) = 𝑆0(𝑒
𝛽1𝑡) (3) 
Here, 𝑒𝛽1  is the acceleration factor of characteristic 𝑥1, which signifies that the probability of 
survival until time 𝑡 for the campaign with 𝑥1 = 1 is equivalent to the probability of 2 until 
time 𝑒𝛽1𝑡 for the campaign with 𝑥1 = 0. If 𝛽1 < 0, the factor 𝑒
𝛽1  indicates diminishing 
(increasing if 𝛽1 > 0) survival time. For example, if 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽1) = 1.05, then, ceteris paribus, 
the presence of characteristic 𝑥1 implies deacceleration of failure times of 5%, and in this sense, 
we can say that the success of the campaign is delayed by 5%. 
4. RESULTS 
We discuss the results in five phases. We begin with the discussion of campaigns. Then, we 
present the non-parametric analysis of the survival function 𝑆(𝑡) via Kaplan-Meier curves. 
Third, we perform a semi-parametric analysis of the hazard function ℎ(𝑡) via the Cox model, 
and bearing in mind the possibility of a violation of the important assumption of this model, 
namely Proportional Hazard (PH), we will discuss the results obtained through the parametric 
analysis of ℎ(𝑡) using accelerated failure time (AFT) via the estimations that assume different 




manner within the reward crowdfunding literature, we use a model dedicated to non-observed 
heterogeneity. The principal intent for which being the addressal of the empirical challenge 
arising due to the possibility of problems caused by a bias because of an omitted variable 
(Keiding et al., 1997; Liu, 2014). 
4.1 Description of Campaigns 
Descriptive information for the 4,262 reward crowdfunding campaigns in this study is 
summarized in Table 2. The campaigns were hosted in 417 cities distributed across five regions 
of Brazil. The campaigns raised more than R$ 38 million between 2011 and 2016. The target 
amount of the campaigns was on an average ~R$ 15 thousand, attracting an average of 96 
pledgers.  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The average duration of the fundraising time for the campaigns was approximately 49 
days, with the time limit established by the platform being 60 days. Almost half of the 
successful campaigns attained the target amount on the last day of the campaign. In this sense, 
it is important to evaluate the success of the campaigns via the models that address the issue of 
censored information. In other words, modeling the time when the campaign remains active on 
the platform until the target amount is reached, via survival analysis, makes it possible to not 
only treat successful campaigns as censored information, but also makes it possible to analyze 
the issue that is particularly relevant and little studied, namely the impact of campaign 
characteristics on the time-to-success. Figure 1 presents the behavior of the total number of 
pledges to the campaigns per day and the average amount invested (in R$).  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
This figure suggests that the initial days of fundraising campaigns account for a greater 
volume of contributions and also receive the highest average amount invested. In failed 
campaigns, the initial number of contributions per day was 2,048. In successful campaigns, the 




campaigns was R$ 75.00, about 13% lesser than the average amount invested in successful 
campaigns.  
We noticed an increase in the number of contributions and the average amount invested 
on the 59th- and 60th day, i.e., a pattern of increase in the amount of contributions and in the 
average amount invested. This can be viewed as a possible signal of an attempt to overcome 
the funding goal in the last days of fundraising. Since the Catarse platform adopts an all-or-
nothing financing system, entrepreneurs receive financial resources only if the amount 
collected is equal to or higher than their project goal. Therefore, we believe that the campaigns' 
time-to-success should be observed with due attention, especially in terms of the use of 
statistical censorship. The observations are termed censored when the information about the 
survival time (success in the current study) is incomplete, and the most often found form is that 
of right censoring. Suppose crowdfunding campaigns are followed by a study for eight weeks, 
it is said that a campaign that attains success during the fundraising period is right-censored as 
the event is observed. Censure is an important issue in survival analysis, and it represents a 
specific type of absent data. To illustrate this, we use censure of the duration until there is 
success in four randomly selected crowdfunding campaigns. According to Figure 2, while the 
censored campaigns 𝐴 and 𝐵 had success during the established platform duration, the 
campaigns 𝐶 and 𝐷 were failures.  
However, when we observe the performance of campaigns with similar characteristics 
to these two campaigns in our database, we can see that the other campaigns obtained success 
with small increases in their durations, such as 7 or 10 days. In this sense, it may not be fair to 
define the campaigns that achieved substantial fractions of their target amounts (70%, 
campaign 𝐶; or 66%, campaign 𝐷) as failures. This is because, if they had an increase in their 




beyond the regression to model survival time as a function of a group of predictive variables. 
First, survival times are generally positive numbers; linear regression may not be the best 
option, unless these times are first transformed in a manner that removes this restriction (Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). Second, and more importantly, common linear regression 
cannot effectively handle the censure of observations (Efron, 1988). Below, we present the 
survival analysis for time-to-success. Unlike the traditional regression models, survival models 
incorporate information from censored and uncensored observations correctly while estimating 
the parameters of important models. 
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The dependent variable in the survival analysis is composed of two parts: i) the moment 
of the event (the campaign time-to-success), and ii) the status of the event (a campaign’s 
success or failure), which registers whether the event of interest occurred or not. We believe 
that the utilization of censure in reward crowdfunding campaign survival analysis can be an 
interesting strategy to investigate the success of campaigns. In addition, Efron (1988) suggests 
that the non-utilization of the censure technique may imply biased estimates.  
Therefore, survival analysis allows the censure of information regarding the campaigns 
that achieved success on the last day of the fundraising period established by the reward 
crowdfunding platform, without having to exclude them from the sample. Owing to this, we 
use two strategies. The first consists of comparing the results of the survival model for the total 
campaign with another survival model eliminating the last day (Table 3). That is, the campaigns 
that obtained success on the last day are considered censored. The stability between the 
estimated coefficients in the two approaches attests to the occurrence of campaign success on 
the last day through the use of censure. The second strategy consists of adopting survival 
models with unobserved heterogeneity, the so-called models with frailty (Keiding et al., 1997).  




Figure 3 shows how the survival of the campaigns diminishes over time. As time passes, 
campaigns obtain success and cease to be part of the survival curve. The concentration of 
successful campaigns is greater from the start of the 40th day of fundraising period and after 
the 60th day. According to Panel A, the survival probability rate of campaigns diminishes from 
0.87 [𝑆(40) for 60 days]) to 0.37 [𝑆(60) for 60 days]), and according to Panel B, it diminishes 
from 0.87 [𝑆(40) = 0.87 for 59 days] to 0.70 [𝑆(60) = 0.70]. This evidence suggests that 
campaigns tend to obtain success toward the end of this process because their exit from the 
survival curve is more pronounced when the time approaches the duration established by the 
platform (Panel A).  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
However, the strongest effect is perceived when we censure the last day, as in Panel B. 
In relation to the instantaneous success rate of the campaigns, we may perceive that when we 
consider 60 days of fundraising (Panel A), the success rate increases from 0.01 [ℎ (40)] to 0.08 
[ℎ(60)]. When we use the 59th day censure (Panel B), the success rate decreases from 0.01 
[ℎ (40)] to 0.005 [ℎ (60)]. The behavior of the instantaneous success rate illustrated in Figure 
3 suggests that when we consider the 60th day censure, the success of the campaigns increases 
considerably between the 40th and the 60th day of fundraising (Panel A). However, the instant 
we apply the 59th day censure (Panel B), success suffers a strong decrease, which indicates 
that the campaigns’ late success occurs essentially during the last day of the duration defined 
by the platform.  
4.3 Semi-Parametric Analysis of the Campaign Hazard Function 
The most popular model in survival analysis is the Cox proportional hazard regression model, 
which investigates the relationship between the predictors of time-to-event (or failure time) 
through the hazard function, ℎ(𝑡). The popularity of the Cox model is essentially due to the 




model (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2010; Bai and Gillen, 2017). In the absence of an expressive 
group of assumptions to verify, the Cox model assumes a proportional hazard for all the 
predictor components of the empirical model, a condition without which the estimates may 
reveal themselves to be invalid. Thus, it is assumed that the predictors have a multiplicative 
effect on the hazard, and that this effect is constant over time, in accordance with (4):  
ℎ (𝑡|𝑥) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝑋1𝛽1
𝑃𝐻 + 𝑋2𝛽2
𝑃𝐻 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑛𝛽𝑛
𝑃𝐻) (4) 
Where 𝑋𝑖s is a set of explanatory variables that shift the hazard function proportionally, 𝛽𝑖
𝑃𝐻s 
are the parameters to be estimated, and ℎ0(𝑡) is called the “baseline hazard …the value when 
all 𝑋𝑖s are equal to zero” (Bradburn et al., 2003, p. 432). In the Cox specification, no assumption 
is made regarding the distribution of ℎ(𝑡). The Cox model was interpreted in terms of hazard 
ratios (HRs), defined as the ratio of the predicted hazard function. An HR greater than 1 implies 
that the event is more likely to occur, and an HR less than 1 implies that the event is less likely 
to occur (or the predictor does not have an effect on the event’s hazard).  
 Note that the hazard function ℎ(𝑡), which in this study represents an approximation of 
a campaign obtaining success at each instant of time, presents an apparently distinct behavior 
in the two models (Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, 𝑆(𝑡); and the smoothed hazard estimate, 
ℎ(𝑡)). For the model with complete information (the upper right corner of Figure 3), the hazard 
increases slowly until approximately the 40th day and accelerates until approximately the 60th 
day. Meanwhile, for the model that does not consider the successes of the final day (the lower 
right corner of Figure 3), we may observe an increase in the success rate (HR) of the campaign 
until the 40th day; however, the success rate diminishes by the 59th day.  
In terms of the possibility that the campaigns that achieve success on the last day have 
received financial assistance from a well-informed agent, as investigated by Crosetto and 




project’s success is not biased as these projects are considered successful. In this sense, by 
using the premise of PH, Table 3 presents the hazard ratios estimated by the Cox regressions 
based on the complete sample, with there being censure of the campaigns that obtained success 
on the final day.  
In all of the models presented in Table 3, our hypotheses were supported. Columns I, 
II, and III provide details about the campaigns that achieved success on the last day of the 
period. The hazard ratios estimated for ln 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙  and ln 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 suggest that the hazard ratio 
(campaign success) diminishes by 42.4% [i.e., (1-0.576) * 100] with an increase of 172% in 
the target amount (ln 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙), and increases by 99% [i.e., (1.990-1) * 100] with an increase of 
172% in the number of pledges (ln 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠). In support of H1 and H2, while we found the 
campaigns with greater financial targets tending to have lower chances of success (hazard ratio 
below 1), we found campaigns with more supporters showing greater chances of success 
(hazard ratio above 1).  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
This result presents the role of community involvement and herding behavior in 
generating pledges since the early days of a campaign as the determinants of campaign success, 
in line with Colombo et al. (2015), Agrawal et al. (2015), and Josefy et al. (2017). In terms of 
the number of rewards promised in exchange for contributions (H3), the results suggest that the 
campaigns that promise more rewards in exchange for contributions present lower chances of 
success. This result contradicts the results obtained by Frydrych et al. (2014), Zvilichovsky et 
al. (2015), and Colombo et al. (2015); it supports the arguments of Cholakova and Clarysse 
(2015), who have argued that the non-financial reasons (symbolic or material rewards) are not 





An alternative interpretation of this result is that campaigns offer more rewards when 
they are trying to compensate for the problems related to the quality of their venture (Vismara, 
2018). This line of thinking is defended by Mollick (2014), who has alleged that the campaigns 
are not in line with reality (elevated targets and rewards) and can end up signaling the 
businesses’ inferior quality, placing the success of the campaigns at risk. In this sense, if 
material rewards play the role of attracting more participants to campaigns, as pointed out by 
Frydrych et al. (2014), the effects of rewards and pledgers tend to be confused by the merely 
descriptive studies. The Cox regression suggests to us (controlled for the number of pledgers) 
that the number of rewards offered act more as a signal of campaigns dedicated to bad projects, 
rather than generating incentives. It also signals that the motivation to contribute to the 
campaigns is not rewards, but rather involvement in the community and altruistic participation. 
In accordance with H4, we have verified that the campaigns initiated in cities with 
greater income inequality tend to have a greater probability of success. This finding supports 
the idea that crowdfunding can reduce inequality, offer work opportunities, and contribute 
toward the reduction of inequalities between regions, even in emerging economies 
(AlliedCrowds, 2016). In column III, we separated the 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 effects of the campaigns, which 
were classified as art-related or not. The most notable effects were found for the 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 of non-
artistic projects. It is expected that the propensity to invest resources in reward crowdfunding 
is greater if the campaign is dedicated to financing new ventures that have the potential to 
contribute to disadvantaged regions, given that non-artistic campaigns are more likely to be 
classified as new venture projects. This argument is based on the assumption that altruism can 
play a dominant role in the success of campaigns, especially in cities that have a greater income 




strong preference for non-artistic campaigns on the part of pledgers, namely graphic design, 
hardware, software, product design, and technology.  
The corresponding estimated effects when we exclude the successes obtained on the 
last day (Censure 59) are all in the same direction, which confirms the hypotheses H1, H2, and 
H4 and contradicts H3. If the last day of the campaign is effectively influenced by agents with 
additional information, such as campaign entrepreneurs or platform owners, this strengthens 
the importance of project characteristics and location to the detriment of the proponent’s 
contact network. The corresponding estimated effects when we exclude the successes on the 
last day (Censure 59) are not that distinct, except when we observe the inequality of income 
distribution. This result suggests that the campaigns with elevated fundraising targets (H1) 
present lower hazard ratios; to put it in other words, the chances of success. In accordance with 
Mollick (2014) and Giudici et al. (2013), pledgers have a certain preference for projects with 
smaller financial dimensions, which are in alignment with the scope of the venture.  
On the other hand, campaigns that receive a larger number of pledges (H2) demonstrate 
greater HR, and as a result, a greater probability of success. The literature indicates that, the 
more pledges a campaign has, the greater its chances of success (Naar, 2016). This is because 
the effort dedicated to the campaign tends to be diluted among a larger number of individual 
contributions (Naar, 2016). Our results converge with those of Colombo et al. (2015), Agrawal 
et al. (2015), and Josefy et al. (2017). In terms of the number of rewards promised in exchange 
for contributions (H3), the results suggest that the campaigns that promise more rewards in 
exchange for contributions have lower chances of success (HR), with there being a value of 
about 0.78 for models with Censure 60 and 0.70 for models with Censure 59.  
While this contradicts the results obtained by Frydrych et al. (2014), Zvilichovsky et al. 




(2015), who have argued that non-financial motives (symbolic or material rewards) are not 
sufficiently significant to motivate individuals to participate actively in crowdfunding, and 
given that they represent relevant economic value, they run the risk of not being delivered 
(Scholz, 2015). An alternative interpretation of this result is that the campaigns that offer the 
greatest number of rewards may be signaling that they are trying to compensate for the 
problems related to the quality of their venture (Vismara, 2018). This line of thinking is argued 
by Mollick (2014), who has alleged that the campaigns are not in line with reality (elevated 
targets and rewards). This can end up signaling the inferior quality of businesses, placing the 
success of the campaigns at risk. In accordance with H4, we verified if the campaigns developed 
in cities with greater income inequality tend to present greater probabilities of success.  
Columns I, II, IV, and V indicate that the campaigns initiated in cities with greater 
income inequality present greater HR, or in other words, have greater chances of success. This 
finding supports the idea that crowdfunding can reduce inequality, offer work opportunities, 
and contribute toward the reduction of inequality among regions, including the emerging 
economies (AlliedCrowds, 2016). Unlike the other variables, the 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 appears to have a greater 
effect on the success of the campaign during the period, as demonstrated by columns IV, V, 
and VI. The estimates indicate that the artistic [𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 × 𝐴𝑟𝑡] and non-artistic campaigns 
developed in cities with greater income inequality are the most successful. However, most of 
the marginal effects were registered for non-artistic campaigns. This is to say that, the greater 
the income concentration in the host city, the greater are the chances of success with non-
artistic campaigns in comparison to others. Non-artistic campaigns in cities with great income 
inequality have a greater probability of success when we control for Censure 59 (a coeffic ient 




In other words, the campaigns dedicated to non-artistic projects, located in cities with 
greater income inequality, tend to have greater chances of success in comparison to the other 
campaigns. This finding highlights the supposition that altruism can play a dominant role in 
campaign success, particularly in cities where income inequality is greater. This finding seems 
to be in line with Mollick (2014), who finds a strong preference among pledgers for campaigns 
related to graphic design, software, product design, and technology. We implemented the Log-
rank test (Savage, 1956; Mantel, 1966) to understand if our data presents the equality of 
survivor function over time, a situation that does not violate the PH assumption on which the 
Cox model is based. As can be seen from the coefficients presented in Table 4, we reject the 
hypothesis that the estimated parameters do not vary over time. Thus, helping us understand 
that the parametric models are more adequate for analyzing the data in this study.  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
4.4 Parametric Analysis of the Campaign Hazard Function 
Parametric models assume a specific distribution of survival times. They hold advantages such 
as greater efficiency (or greater power according to Bradburn et al, 2003), which can be 
particularly useful with smaller samples. The Cox semi-parametric model is seen as a secure 
and proven method, which does not require a specific distribution of data. Thus, it is the most 
commonly used model in the analysis of survival data, while depending on the PH assumption.  
Campaign characteristics can influence the duration of the fundraising period, and they 
can also exhibit non-constant effects over time, violating the important assumption of the PH 
model, as shown in Table 4. A variety of parametric techniques can model survival times when 
the PH assumption is violated. However, it is a challenge for researchers to determine the most 
appropriate data distribution, and parametric models have the disadvantage of providing 
misleading inferences if the distributive assumptions are not met (Hosmer et al, 2008). In the 




which assumes a particular distribution of survival. There are three main forms: i) the 
parametric proportional hazard model, which takes the form of the Cox model but assumes a 
parametric form for the baseline hazard; ii) the additive hazard model, in which the predictors 
affect the hazard function in an additive manner rather than a multiplicative manner; and iii) 
the accelerated failure time (AFT), which is similar to the conventional linear regression model 
and therefore offers more flexibility in the understanding of covariates with non-constant 
effects on time-to-success. The individual effect of each predictor in the AFT model is 
interpreted in terms of TR, where the ratio denotes the acceleration factor. Unlike HR, when 
the TR assumes values greater than 1, this suggests that the event is less likely to occur, and 
when it is less than 1, it indicates that the event is more likely to occur. In general, the AFT 
model can be expressed as follows: 
ln(𝑇)  = 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛 + ln(𝜀)  (5) 
Where 𝑇 is the time-to-event (or time-to-success) and 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛, e 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ⋯ , 𝛽𝑛 are the 
predictive variables and their estimated parameters, respectively. While ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline 
hazard function (equation (4)), (𝜀) is the error term, which is assumed to be a particular 
parametric distribution. Traditional regressions and the AFT model differ in the following 
ways: i) the predictive variables in the AFT model affect the time of the event multiplicatively; 
ii) the AFT model accommodates censored observations; and iii) the error term of the AFT 
model, even though it is independent and identically distributed (iid), does not follow a normal 
distribution. Some of the parametric distributions assumed in survival models include 
exponential, Weibull, generalized gamma, log-normal, and log-logistic distributions.  
These are commonly used in place of a normal distribution (given that the event times 
have positive values and generally have a skewed distribution), making a normal symmetric 
distribution a poor choice to fit the data. Table 5 permits a comparison similar to that reported 




that does not consider success on the last day of the campaign (Censure 59). However, in Table 
5, parametric models are used. The distributions adopted by these models for the hazard 
function are in accordance with the conventional selection criteria of parametric models, and 
as a function of their respective AICs, these resulted in the selection of Weibull, log-logistic, 
and log-normal models. These models were also selected because they present the most 
appropriate statistical fit for the behavior of the distribution of our data and a proper 
preservation of their increasing relationship, as indicated in Figure 3. Unlike the metric in the 
Cox proportional hazard models (PH) (Table 3), these models fall under the accelerated failure 
time (AFT) metric, or in other words, the time-to-success. This is why the values reported 
represent failure time ratios (TR), rather than hazard ratios (HR), as shown in Table 5.  
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
For example, a failure time ratio of 1.48 for the fundraising target indicates an increase 
of 172%, which is capable of delaying the campaign’s success (increasing survival) by 48%. 
Drawing a comparison of the estimates of the Weibull model for censure on the 60th day and 
the Log-logistic model for censure on the 59th day (the best models in each case according to 
the Akaike criteria - AIC), while an increase of 172% of the target or the number of pledgers 
is capable of contributing to the delay of 15.6% or acceleration of 16.4% of the success of the 
project for the first case, in the second case, these values increase to a delay of 48% or an 
acceleration of 32%.  
In turn, the campaigns that offer greater rewards to sponsors present a delay in their 
time-to-success from 0.7% (Weibull for Censure 60) to 16.8% (Log-logistic for Censure 59). 
The campaigns located in areas with greater concentrations of income should have their time-
to-success reduced from 26.7% (Weibull for Censure 60) to 77.6% (Log-logistic for Censure 
59). Finally, artistic campaigns may suffer a delay in their time-to-success that ranges from 




campaigns are more successful. The effects of the ln 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 and 𝐴𝑟𝑡 covariates will 
also be in the same direction as the Cox estimates, and are found to be more expressive when 
using censure for the last day of the campaigns. In other words, the results suggest indications 
of the existence of a bias in traditional models (such as logit), which are caused by considering 
successful campaigns that depend on the late intervention of an informed agent interested in 
the success of the campaigns, the estimates of covariate effects, and the sense of underreporting 
these impacts.  
4.5 Robustness Tests and Additional Analysis 
According to Liu (2014), for the identification of survival models, it is useful to consider two 
sources of variables in the duration data: i) variability resulting from the observable hazard 
factors in the model and ii) heterogeneity caused by the covariates that are not considered in 
the model, i.e., we would have a potential bias due to the omitted variable, one of the most 
frequent sources of endogeneity (Bhattacharjee et al., 2007). Unobserved heterogeneity may 
refer to, for example, the quality of the campaigns or the characteristics of their entrepreneurs.  
Individual unobserved risks are termed “frailty” in a survival analysis. The unobserved 
frailty factor can be represented by a random effect (𝛼𝑖) that affects the hazard function in a 
multiplicative manner, ℎ (𝑡|𝛼𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖ℎ (𝑡). Keiding et al. (1997) and Lambert et al. (2004) have 
shown that the AFT model is more stable than the PH model in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, given that the estimates for the parameters of AFT models are less affected by 
the choice of the probability distribution. In this study, we contemplate the unobserved 
heterogeneity found in campaigns in an unprecedented and robust manner. The treatment of 
unobserved heterogeneity was realized through the inclusion of a frailty parameter in the robust 




with censure on the 60th- and 59th day are reported in Panels A and B of Table 6, which can be 
compared to the models that include unobserved heterogeneity (models with frailty).  
We can see from Table 6 that all of the reported estimates are in the same direction as 
the models presented above. Further, they are more significant in censuring the last day of the 
campaign. The greatest contrasts are related to ln 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 , ln 𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 , and 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 in any of the 
assumed distributions, i.e., Weibull, Log-logistic, or Log-normal. While it is difficult to 
determine the parameter that captures this heterogeneity, if some of the characteristics related 
to the quality of the project are being absorbed, this may explain the less relevant effect of 
rewards, given that when we control the quality of the project, the effect of rewards as a proxy 
tends to diminish. If the heterogeneity parameter captures some of the characteristics related to 
the predisposition to self-pledge (Crosetto and Regner, 2018), this would also explain the 
stronger effect of the fundraising target, the number of pledgers, and the income concentration, 
increasing the importance of the parsimonious choice concerning the value of the project in the 
proponent’s contact network. The effects seem to be stronger, taking homogeneity into account 
for all the variables (in general). 
*********************************************************PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study contributes to the growing literature on crowdfunding. Based on our results, 
entrepreneurs, pledgers, and platform managers can learn from the time-to-success 
determinants of reward crowdfunding campaigns by particularly focusing on the influence of 
campaign attributes and location. The time-to-success of reward crowdfunding campaigns is 
estimated in a new manner using the survival analysis models. We employed a semi-parametric 
PH Cox model and a parametric AFT model. In addition, our results are robust when we 
consider unobserved heterogeneity models, which consider endogeneity effects because of the 




Crowdfunding allows the rise of new ventures that are unable to obtain financing 
through traditional means (Hildebrand et al., 2017; Stanko and Henard, 2017; Cornelius and 
Gokpinar, 2020). This is particularly relevant in environments characterized by high capital 
costs (Mendes-Da-Silva et al., 2016). We study a unique database covering more than 4,200 
campaigns initiated in 417 cities distributed across Brazil. They were all hosted on Catarse 
during the period 2011-2016, which raised more than R$ 38 million in reward crowdfunding 
campaigns during this period. The platform adopts the all-or-nothing system, where the 
entrepreneur receives “all” if the campaign is successful (reaches the funding target) and 
“nothing” in case of a failure. In our data, 52% of the campaigns were successful and 48% were 
failures, which is an interesting dataset to study the success of crowdfunding campaigns, 
determinants of their success, and time-to-success. 
We found that the reward crowdfunding campaigns that achieve success more rapidly 
are those that are characterized by a lower target amount, a larger number of pledges, and a 
smaller number of rewards. Moreover, the higher and faster rates of success are predominantly 
found in non-art projects and are located in cities with greater income inequality. The 
interaction between both also shows that, for regions of higher inequality, non-art projects are 
preferred at a higher rate. Overall, the results show that the pledgers tend to prefer small 
projects located in areas with greater inequality, particularly non-art projects. This indicates 
that, more than compensation, pledgers are interested in the quality and purpose of projects and 
tend to invest in projects that may produce a positive social impact and contribute toward the 
reduction of inequality in the region.  
In addition, we find that the covariates adopted in the empirical model influence the 
time-to-success in a non-constant manner during fundraising. This finding suggests the need to 




of the covariates, we have verified their behavior when we did not consider the campaigns that 
reached their target amount only on the last day of the fundraising period, when the agents with 
greater information in relation to the campaigns can act to secure the success of the campaigns. 
Such an agent may be an entrepreneur or even the owner of a reward crowdfunding platform 
(Crosetto and Regner, 2018). Our data do not allow us to test the evidence of self-funding, and 
we are not even sure if the contributions come directly from poor or rich people. However, we 
used unique data for the host cities of the campaigns in the largest crowdfunding platform of 
Brazil. Under the assumption of PH, Cox models on the one hand suggest that we can verify 
that the host city of campaigns exercises an economically stronger effect over time during the 
fundraising period. On the other hand, they suggest that the other covariates possess an 
essentially similar effect during the duration of the fundraising period, even though the tests 
conducted indicate that all of the covariates have a non-constant effect on time-to-success. The 
estimates obtained via the AFT models do not contradict the principal findings. 
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Table 1. Literature Regarding the Success of Reward Crowdfunding Campaigns and their Methods 
Authorship Platforms Method(a) 
All-or-
nothing(b) 
Burtch et al (2013) Journalism crowdfunding platform (USA) 2SLS, OLS and GMM No 
Giudici et al (2013) 11 crowdfunding platforms (Italy) P Mixed 
Crosetto and Regner (2014) Startnext (Germany) P Yes 
Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) Kickstarter (USA) OLRR Yes 
Mollick (2014) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Colombo et al (2015) Kickstarter (USA) T and P Yes 
Cordova et al (2015) Eppela (Italy), Indiegogo and Kickstarter (USA) P Mixed 
Hörisch (2015) Indiegogo (USA) L No 
Zvilichovsky et al (2015) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Koch and Siering (2015) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Li et al (2016) Kickstarter (USA) SA Yes 
Calic and Mosakowski (2016) Kickstarter (USA) L and OLS Yes 
Hobbs et al (2016) Kickstarter (USA) DA Yes 
Shi and Guan (2016) Jing Dong Crowdfunding Platform (China) L Yes 
Courtney et al (2017) Kickstarter (USA) L and P Yes 
Skirnevskiy et al (2017) Kickstarter (USA) L and T Yes 
Josefy et al (2017) Kickstarter and GoFundMe (USA) L and RR Mixed 
Bi et al (2017) zhongchou.com (China) HMR No 
Allison et al (2017) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Parhankangas and Renko (2017) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Giudici et al (2017) 13 reward-based platforms (Italy) T Mixed 
Chan et al (2018) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Clauss et al (2018) Visionbakery (Germany) L Yes 
Crosetto and Regner (2018) Startnext (Germany) P and PD Yes 
De Larrea et al (2018) Kickstarter (USA) HMR Yes 
Hörisch (2018) 
Ecocrowd (Germany) and Oneplanetcrowd 
(Europe) 
L Mixed 
Lagazio and Querci (2018) Indiegogo (USA) P No 
Oo et al. (2019) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Cruz (2018) Kickstarter (USA) P Yes 
Zhou et al. (2018) Kickstarter (USA) L Yes 
Wang et al. (2018) Dreamore platform (China) L Yes 
Lee and Chiravuri (2019) Indiegogo (USA) L Yes 
Yang et al. (2019) Tencent Lejuan crowdfunding platform (China) OLS No 
Yeh et al. (2019) 
Zeczec and FlyingV (Taiwanese) Campfire and 
Makuake (Japan) 
L Yes 
This study Catarse (Brazil) SA Yes 
Note: 2SLS = two-stage least squares, OLS = ordinary least squares, GMM = generalized method of moments, P = probit, SA 
= survival analysis, OLRR = ordinal logit with robust errors, L = logit; T = Tobit, DA = discriminant analysis, RR = robust 
regression, HMR = hierarchical multiple regression, PD = panel data. (a) describes the method employed in the estimation of 
the campaign’s success, and (b) indicates whether the platform considered in the study is of the all-or-nothing type. 
 
Table 4. Test of the Violation of the Proportional Hazard (PH) Assumption 








Source: Calculation by the authors Note: This table presents the log-rank test for equality in the survivor function, that is, it 
verifies whether the assumption of constancy in the estimated parameters (PH) is violated. Based on this test, we can see tha t 
all of the analyzed variables presented variation within groups (observed vs. expected) over time; thus, the Cox model is not 






Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Considered Variables (Successful and Unsuccessful Campaigns) 
 Aggregate (N = 4,262) Successful (N = 2,223) Unsuccessful (N = 2,039) t-test 
Goal 15,004.52 12,386.13 17,859.19 10.45*** 
Pledges 95.98 162.34 23.63 -24.49*** 
Rewards 8.80 9.30 8.25 -7.91*** 
Duration 48.89 47.23 50.68 7.95*** 
Gini 0.60 0.61 0.59 -5.97*** 
Art 0.78 0.80 0.76 -3.37*** 
Popold 8.25 8.35 8.14 -3.89*** 
Illiteracy 4.50 4.15 4.89 4.85*** 
Duration % 
(days) 
    
1 - 9 1.06 1.17 0.93  
10 - 19 3.03 3.87 2.11  
20 - 29 5.63 6.57 4.61  
30 - 39 10.89 12.91 8.68  
40 - 49 19.94 21.50 18.24  
50 - 59 5.91 6.43 5.35  
≥60 53.54 47.55 60.08  
Source: Calculation by the authors. Note: Among the 2,223 successful campaigns, 1,057 (47.5%) achieved success only on 
day 60, which was the last day of the campaign. The exception is 19 projects (0.85%) in 2015, when the platform adopted a 
strategy of offering extra time. The maximum duration of these campaigns exceeded the standard time limit of 60 days adopted 
by the Catarse platform. This occurred due to a policy adopted by the platform to offer extra time for campaigns judged to be 
close to achieving their target amount. This policy was only implemented in 2015, and affected 30 campaigns, of which 29 
had an extension of two days and one had an extension of nine additional days. It should be noted that successful campaigns 
have, on average, a smaller target amount, more pledgers, more rewards, and are hosted in cities with relative inequality of 
income distribution (Krugman, 1992). ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 3. Analysis of Campaign Success Factors based on the Cox PH Model 
  Panel A: Censure 60 (N = 4,262)   Panel B: Censure 59 (N = 4,262) 
  (I) (II) (III)   (IV) (V) (VI) 
lnGoal 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.577***  0.557*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
lnPledges 1.992*** 1.990*** 1.989***  1.954*** 1.947*** 1.944*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
lnRewards 0.783*** 0.786*** 0.786***  0.698*** 0.703*** 0.702*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)  (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Gini 3.321*** 3.430***   10.72*** 9.588***  
 (1.385) (1.362)   (6.363) (5.893)  
Art 0.762*** 0.761***   0.622*** 0.622***  
 (0.041) (0.041)   (0.042) (0.042)  
Gini × Art   3.191***    8.084*** 
   (1.270)    (4.605) 
Gini × (1-Art)   4.947***    17.349*** 
   (1.983)    (9.913) 
Popold Yes No No  Yes No No 
Illiteracy Yes No No  Yes No No 
LR chi2 1,892.47*** 1,891.55*** 1,890.86***  1,023.98*** 1,021.17*** 1,020.22*** 
Log-Lik. -16,607.36 -16,607.81 -16,608.16  -8,953.72 -8,955.13 -8,955.60 
AIC 33,228.71 33,225.63 33,226.32  17,921.45 17,920.26 17,921.21 
# of success 2,223 2,223 2,223  1,166 1,166 1,166 
Source: Calculation by the authors. Note: This table presents the hazard ratios (HRs) estimated for the time-to-success of the 
reward crowdfunding campaigns. The dependent variable was the campaign duration. The estimated models are in the same 
metric evaluation, which is proportional hazard (PH). Columns I, II, and III refer to the censure of 60 days imposed by the 
crowdfunding platform, reflecting a situation in which well-informed agents do not act on the final day. Columns IV, V, and 
VI refer to censure imposed on day 59 of the campaign, designed to not consider campaigns that achieved success on the final 
day of the fundraising period. All variables are defined in Section 3. 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 × 𝐴𝑟𝑡, 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 × (1-Art), 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑑 and 𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 are 







Table 5. Analysis of the Success Factors Based on Parametric Models  
 Censure 60 (N = 4,262)   Censure 59 (N = 4,262) 
  Weibull LogLogistic LogNormal  Weibull LogLogistic LogNormal 
lnGoal 1.156*** 1.291*** 1.354***  1.318*** 1.480*** 1.503*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.014)  (0.018) (0.028) (0.029) 
lnPledges 0.836*** 0.770*** 0.734***  0.730*** 0.680*** 0.666*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
lnRewards 1.070*** 1.112*** 1.153***  1.170*** 1.168*** 1.199*** 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.027)  (0.043) (0.046) (0.050) 
Gini 0.733*** 0.493*** 0.430***  0.333*** 0.224*** 0.216*** 
 (0.075) (0.064) (0.066)  (0.090) (0.061) (0.062) 
Art 1.078*** 1.178*** 1.218***  1.265*** 1.349*** 1.372*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.026)  (0.041) (0.047) (0.051) 
LR chi2 1,909.15*** 2,038.63*** 2,186.73***  1,036.81*** 1,224.13*** 1,224.96*** 
Log-Lik. -1,401.00 -1,554.67 -1,772.83  -2,339.36 -2,230.15 -2,242.05 
AIC 2,816.01 3,123.35 3,559.67  4,692.72 4,474.30 4,498.11 
Failures (success) 2,223 2,223 2,223  1,166 1,166 1,166 
Source: Calculation by the authors Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients for the time to success of projects based 
on parametric models. The dependent variable was the time to success of the campaigns. The estimated models are in the same 
evaluation metric, that is, the accelerated failure time (AFT), with the coefficients expressed in time ratios. All variables are 









































Table 6. Analysis of the Success Factors Based on the Parametric Models Considering Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
 Panel A: Time-to-success acceleration ratios for Censure 60 (for unobserved heterogeneity) 
 Without Frailty (N = 4,262)   With Frailty (N = 4,262) 
  Weibull LogLogistic LogNormal   Weibull LogLogistic LogNormal 
lnGoal 1.156*** 1.291*** 1.354***  1.179*** 1.291*** 1.354*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
lnPledges 0.836*** 0.770*** 0.734***  0.823*** 0.777*** 0.734*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
lnRewards 1.070*** 1.112*** 1.153***  1.078*** 1.112*** 1.153*** 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.027)  (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) 
Gini 0.733*** 0.493*** 0.430***  0.681*** 0.494*** 0.432*** 
 (0.075) (0.064) (0.066)  (0.074) (0.064) (0.067) 
Art 1.078*** 1.178*** 1.218***  1.096*** 1.178*** 1.218*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.026)  (0.017) (0.022) (0.026) 
LR chi2 1,909.15*** 2,038.63*** 2,186.73***  1,100.63*** 1,053.73*** 1,355.57*** 
Log-Lik. -1,401.00 -1,554.67 -1,772.83  -1,395.88 -1,553.49   -1,772.01 
AIC 2,816.01 3,123.35 3,559.67  2,807.76 3,122.98 3,560.02 
# of success 2,223 2,223 2,223  2,223 2,223 2,223 
Panel B: Time-to-success acceleration ratios for Censure 59 (for unobserved heterogeneity) 
  Without Frailty (N = 4,262)   With Frailty (N = 4,262) 
  Weibull LogLogistic LogNormal   Weibull LogLogistic LogNormal 
lnGoal 1.318*** 1.480*** 1.503***  1.539*** 1.535*** 1.557*** 
 (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.321) 
lnPledges 0.730*** 0.680*** 0.666***  0.671*** 0.673*** 0.653*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
lnRewards 1.170*** 1.168*** 1.199***  1.154*** 1.142*** 1.188*** 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.050)  (0.045) (0.043) (0.050) 
Gini 0.333*** 0.224*** 0.216***  0.206*** 0.201*** 0.199*** 
 (0.090) (0.061) (0.062)  (0.054) (0.053) (0.056) 
Art 1.265*** 1.349*** 1.372***  1.362*** 1.333*** 1.383*** 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.051)  (0.048) (0.046) (0.053) 
LR chi2 1,036.81*** 1,224.13*** 1,224.96***  1,300.67*** 1,303.75*** 1,260.54*** 
Log-Lik. -2,339.36 -2,230.15 -2,242.05  -2,172.66 -2,164.62 -2,224.25 
AIC 4,692.72 4,474.30 4,498.11  4,361.33 4,345.24 4,464.51 
# of success 1,166 1,166 1,166  1,166 1,166 1,166 
Source: Calculation by the authors Note: This table presents the estimated coefficients for the time-to-success of projects based 
on parametric models and unobserved heterogeneity models. The dependent variable was the duration of the campaign. The 
estimated models are in the same evaluation metric, that is, the accelerated failure time (AFT), with the coefficients expressed 
as time ratios (TR). Panel A presents a comparison including an estimated frailty parameter for ‘Censure 60’. Panel B presents 
a comparison including an estimated frailty parameter for ‘Censure 59’, which does not consider the failures (successes) that 
occur on the last day of the crowdfunding campaign. All variables are defined in Section 3. We controlled all estimates by 
inserting the connectivity variable, which indicates whether the region where the campaign was based had access to mobile 
broadband internet. We tried to control all the results reported in this table when considering the variable Connectivity (dummy 
variable with value = 1 when host cities of the campaigns had broadband internet coverage, and 0 otherwise); however, the 











              Source: Calculations by the authors. Note: See note for Table 2. 
 
Figure 2. Example of the Implementation of Censure in the Duration of Crowdfunding Campaigns  
 
Source: Calculations by the authors. Note: An example of the four campaigns is randomly selected from the 
collected data. The horizontal axis represents the duration of the campaign (days). Campaigns 𝐶 and 𝐷 are 
classified as failures, while campaigns 𝐴 and 𝐵 are successful because they reached the target amount before the 
end of the campaign. Each campaign is represented in the following format: project identifier (𝑤, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧), where 
𝑤 is the campaign’s target amount, 𝑥 is the campaign’s duration, 𝑦 is time-to-success in number of days, and 𝑧 is 
the percentage of the target amount received by the final day of the campaign. Even though 𝑤 and 𝑥 are available 




Figure 3. Estimates for Time-to-Success (Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates, 𝑆(𝑡)) and the Smoothed 
Hazard Estimate, ℎ(𝑡)) for Campaigns of 60 and 59 days 
 
Source: Calculation by the authors. Note: This figure presents a graphical representation of the survival function 
𝑆(𝑡) with probabilities estimated by the Kaplan-Meier method including 95% confidence bands, and on the right, 
curves that describe the instantaneous rate of occurrence of the event over time, namely the hazard function ℎ(𝑡) 
estimated for the time-to-success of reward crowdfunding projects with fundraising campaigns up to 60 days 
(Panel A), and up to 59 days (Panel B). Censoring is indicated by vertical marks (at 40 and 60) for Panel A and 
vertical marks (at 40 and 59) for Panel B. The number of campaigns at risk points (success at different times) is 
displayed in the graph. The point in Panel A (60 days) on the x-axis, where the horizontal dashed line has a 
survival probability of .87, intersects the curve representing the estimated median survival time (40 days) and .37 
for median survival time (60 days). On the y-axis, where the vertical dashed line at a smoothed hazard estimate 
of .01, the curve represents the estimated instantaneous success rate (40 days) and .08 for the instantaneous success 
rate (60 days). In Panel B, on the x-axis, where the horizontal dashed line, which has a survival probability of .87, 
intersects the curve represents the estimated median survival time (40 days) and .70 the median survival time (60 
days), respectively. On the y-axis, the point where the vertical dashed line at a smoothed hazard estimate of .01 
intersects the curve represents the estimated instantaneous success rate (at 40 days) and .005 for the instantaneous 
success rate (at 60 days). The censuring for the 59 day campaign does not consider the campaigns that achieved 
success on the last day of the fundraising period. Based on this figure, it is possible to understand that the longer 
the campaign, the greater the chance of success. Table 2 shows the 40 th and 60th days as the highest concentrations 
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